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1. I N T R O D U C T I O N 
In the immediate after-war years, rising living standards were enjoyed across the entire 
workforce of most OECD member countries, regardless of an individual position in the 
wage distribution. As such, the means to eradicate poverty aimed at ensuring that indi-
viduals were in work. Economic growth would then keep poverty at bay. However, from 
the beginning of the 1980s it seems that in several countries (most notably in the UK and 
the USA) the link between high growth and low poverty began to break down. Rising 
wage inequality and a rise in the proportion of households headed by low wage workers 
(typically single parents or households with a single earner) seem to have brought about 
this new trend. Hence, low wages are now a key issue in the struggle to alleviate poverty. 
In this scenario, minimum wages, despite bad textbook press, have emerged forcefully 
in the policy discussions with the traditional slogan "make work pay more than welfare" 
being back in play. An example of the change of viewpoint is the recent recommenda-
tion by the OECD (1998): "A well-designed policy package of economic measures, with 
an appropriately set minimum wage in tandem with in-work benefits, is likely, on balance, 
to be beneficial in moving towards an employment-centred social policy"} The role of the 
minimum wage setting differs among countries and over time. In the USA, the Reagan 
administration maintained a fixed nominal minimum which effectively lowered the wage 
floor in real terms and, according to the research by Di NARDO, FORTIN and LEMIEUX 
(1996), its declining value in real terms can explain something like 25 % of the rise in 
wage inequality, a much larger number than others had thought plausible. During the 
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1. Four years before the OECD recommended to "reassess the role of statutory minimum wages as 
an instrument to achieve redistributive goals, and switch to more direct instruments. If it is judged 
desirable to maintain a legal minimum wage as part of an anti-poverty strategy, consider minimis-
ing its adverse employment effects..." (OECD, 1994) 
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Bush mandate, in turn, Congress enacted increases in the minimum wage which took ef-
fect in 1990 and 1991. On top of these increases, the Clinton Administration has consid-
ered a further increase of the federal hourly minimum from $4.25 in 1996 to $5.15 in 
1997.2 By contrast, in 1993, the Conservative government in the UK abolished the 26 re^ 
maining Wages Councils (except in agriculture) which set minimum wages for 2.5 mil-
lion workers in low-paid sectors, giving rise to an increasing wage inequality which ex-
acted a strong electoral price from the tories in the last general election. Consequently, 
the Labour government instated successfully a National Minimum hourly wage of £3.70 
for adults and £3.20 for youngsters. The French government after failing to launch a re-
form to allow young people under 25 to be paid less than the minimum wage, withdrew 
the amendment in 1994. In view of the forceful reaction to this proposal, the subsequent 
Socialist government took a rise in the minimum wage as one of its key electoral pro-
mises. Consistently, during 1997 and 1998, the Jospin government has decided successive 
extra increases in the minimum wage over that required by law. The prevention of an 
excessive increase in labour costs as a consequence of the definitive settlement of the 
statutory 35-hour week from January 2000 has been the main reason to explain no 
further extra increase since 1999. The Spanish government, in turn, has pursued a very 
different strategy. In exchange to moderate increases in the national minimum wage (ad-
justed to the expected increase in the consumer price index), it has agreed to remove the 
youth minimum wage at the request of the Spanish unions. Some recent changes in this 
area have also taken place in the developing countries. Thus, for example, two of the 
fast-growing East-Asian "tigers", Taiwan and Korea, introduced non-negligible mini-
mum wages at the turn of the decade, while the same happened recently in two relatively 
successful Eastern European countries, Hungary and Poland. 
Thus, despite the harsh judgement given by standard economics, minimum wages con-
tinually surface as a proper tool for redistributing income. The standard competitive 
model of the labour market says that, if the price of workers is artificially increased by a 
minimum wage, labour demand will fall. Thus, critics of the minimum wage argue that, 
far from helping the poor, a minimum is more likely to leave them worse off. Raising 
unskilled wages will mean that employers take ön fewer workers, pushing up unemploy-
ment and raising poverty. Furthermore, they argue that it may be ineffective, since rela-
tively few of the lowest-paid workers are from poor families. By contrast, proponents of 
the minimum wage take the competitive working of the labour market as the exception, 
rather than the rule, arguing that in many reasonable instances "monopsony" (upward-
sloping labour supply to the individual firm) corresponds to the rule. After all, nobody 
would agree with the competitive model prediction that if a firm pushes down wages all 
employees would immediately walk out and find jobs paying more elsewhere. In such a 
case, assuming that it is set at the right level, proponents of the minimum wage say that it 
2. In November 1999, this process has culminated with the approval of a Republican plan to raise 
the federal minimum wage by $1 an hour over three years, to $6.15 - providing a variety of tax 
breaks. In great contrast to earlier clashes, Republicans agreed to increase the minimum wage 
and the debate focused on how to increase the minimum instead of whether to increase it at all. 
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would help to reduce poverty and income inequality at the same time. Not only would it 
raise the incomes of the lowest-paid employees, but it would also narrow the gap be-
tween their pay and that of those further up the pay scale. 
Until the nineties (see, e.g. the survey in BROWN, GILROY and KOHEN, 1982), most of 
the evidence seemed to confirm the critics' viewpoint. Specially during the 1970s and 
1980s there appeared to be a strong correlation between several OECD countries' rela-
tively high minimum wages and rising unemployment among young workers (Europe 
and USA) and among some ethnic minorities (blacks and Hispanics in the USA). How-
ever, this orthodox view has been challenged, particularly in the USA (see CARD and 
KRUEGER, 1995), by several authors who studied the employment effects of two recent 
minimum wage increases in the early 1990s, finding no measurable impact on employ-
ment in a wide range of very low-wage sectors, considered most vulnerable to a mini-
mum rise. Indeed, in several cases they even found that job numbers had even increased. 
Recent research in the UK, following the abolition of wage councils (see, e.g., MACHIN 
and MANNING, 1996), and in some other European countries, following significant 
changes in minimum wages (see, e.g., DOLADO et al., 1996) echoed those unexpected 
findings. 
The new evidence has not gone unchallenged (see, e.g., the papers criticising CARD 
and KRUEGER'S evidence in AER, 1995 and KENN AN, 1995): errors creeping from tele-
phone surveys which underlie the US evidence, an improvement in the efficiency of the 
sectors affected by the abolition of the minimum wage in the UK, the mere fact that 
"teenagers like hamburgers" in the experiment analysed by CARD and KRUEGER (1995) 
about the employment effects on New Jersey fast foods, etc., have been claimed against 
the revisionist results. Nonetheless, some of these counter-arguments suffer from the 
same sort of flaws as the papers they aim to attack (reduced sample sizes, lack of proper 
controls, etc.). Thus, cutting through the emotive positions of proponents and opponents, 
in order to offer a more balanced assessment of the impact of the minimum there is no 
substitute for moving one step backwards and try to answer the following basic ques-
tions: (i) Why is the minimum wage a useful redistributive tool?; (ii) How binding are 
minimum wage floors in different countries?; (iii) To what extent do minimum wage 
have the adverse consequences standard analysis predict?; (iv) Are there strong theore-
tical grounds underlying the revisionist results?; (v) Who support minimum wages? (vi) 
Under which conditions is the minimum wage a better tool than other policy instruments 
to achieve income redistribution? and, finally, (vii) What is the overall cross-country 
time-series evidence regarding the employment effects of minima? 
Our aim in this paper is to provide some reflections on those seven issues by devoting 
the following seven sections to each of them. 
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2. CHARACTERISTICS OF THE MINIMUM WAGE AS A REDISTRIBUTTVE 
TOOL 
It is well taken that all methods of redistribution have some unintended adverse effects 
on incentives and behaviour. The key question, therefore, is not whether the mini-
mum wage distorts market outcomes in absolute terms, but how its distortionary effects 
compare with those of other modes of redistribution, or with the benefits of redistribu-
tion. 
According to FREEMAN (1996) there could be, in principle, four attributes of mini-
mum wages which make them an attractive redistributive tool: 
2.1. It has no immediate budgetary consequences 
Pass a minimum wage law and neither taxes nor public sector borrowing requirement 
rise (contrast with negative income taxes or subsidies for low-wage workers, both of 
which come out of the government budget). This is not, however, the case for countries 
(e.g. Netherlands and Spain) where unemployment benefits are directly linked to the 
minimum wage. Thus if there is a case for raising the minimum wage, there should also 
be a case for decoupling it from benefits and social security contributions. 
2.2. It increases incentive to work 
Measured labour participation may fall owing to the adverse employment effects of the 
minimum (if there are such effects) but, if jobs are available a the minimum wage, peo-
ple will take them (assuming that unemployment benefits are sufficiently low). By con-
trast, most ways of transferring income to the poor (family income supplements subsi-
dies to consumption items, etc) typically have distorting effects reducing the incentive 
to work. However, by increasing participation it may reduce further accumulation of hu-
man capital by those workers who withdraw from schooling in favour of early participa-
tion in the labour market. Further, it may adversely affect on-the-job training since the 
existence of wage floors prevents firms from shifting onto wages the proportion of the 
training cost which should be financed by the worker. 
2.3. It is administratively simple 
Thus, it makes it easy to determine compliance and report violations, minimising the 
need for a sizeable enforcement agency. Nonetheless, employers can find subtle ways 
to reduce the hourly wage without violating the statutory minimum, examples of which 
are extension of working time or reduction of training schemes (though in some 
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circumstances this may be advantageous to the workers and the firm if it avoids shut-
down). 
2.4. It establishes the "right" social cost of labour in the markets 
If the minimum reflects what society will, in fact, provide the low paid, this makes low-
wage firms and, ultimately, the consumers of their products, bear the full cost of that la-
bour, rather than having to pay for a part of the cost through taxes and subsidies. In 
other words, minimum wages do not subsidise low-wage jobs, as do other forms of redis-
tribution. In this respect, consumers are often ready to support minimum wage rises 
even if they are not particularly favourable to social welfare schemes (people prefer to 
reward those who work, i.e., the "deserving" poor rather than those who do not work, 
i.e., the "underselling"). 
3. HOW BINDING ARE MINIMUM WAGES? 
Two standard measures are used: i) the Kaitz index, namely, the ratio of the minimum to 
average wage, and ii) the "spike" in the wage distribution corresponding to the mini-
mum, namely, the fraction of workers paid at or close to the minimum. In Table 1 we 
present a comprehensive summary of the systems of minimum wages in operation in 
the OECD (see DOLADO et al, 1996 and NEUMARK and WASCHER, 1999). 
Minimum wages in most European countries are about 50-70 % of average earning 
(35 % in Spain) compared to 33 % in the USA. In countries with a number of different 
minimum wages, there are obviously difficulties in computing a single measure of the 
Kaitz index. In countries with a single statutory minimum, the effective Kaitz index will 
be much higher for less skilled than for more skilled workers because the numerator in 
the index is the national minimum and the denominator is much lower for the former 
class of workers. 
Given a higher Kaitz index in Europe than the USA, it is tempting to claim that mini-
mum wages might cause job losses in Europe even if they do not in the USA (see, e.g. 
OECD Jobs Study, 1994). But this may be mistaken. Many commentators feel that the 
effect of minimum wage is strongest in the youth labour market. However, the USA 
has little provision for lower youth minimum wage (the Kaitz index for young workers 
was 85 % before the 1996 reform) but most European countries have extensive variation 
in the minimum by age. 
Although the Kaitz index is the most widely used measure of the impact of the mini-
mum, concerns are expressed about its use as a measure of the impact of minimum 
wages. This is so, since it could be the case that a rise in the minimum wage, affects the 
average wage and the available evidence suggest that this is the case (see, e.g. BAZEN 
and MARTIN, 1991 and DOLADO, FELGUEROSO and JIMENO, 1997) but that the change 
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Table 1: Minimum Wages in the O E C D Countries 
Country 
Australia 
Belgium 
Spain 
France 
Greece 
Netherlands 
Portugal 
UK(*) 
USA 
Germany 
Austria 
Denmark 
Ireland 
Italy 
UK<**> 
Sweden 
Kaitz Index Minimum Wage 
Earners (%) 
[National Minimum Wage] 
0.35 (1992) 
0.60 (1992) 
0.35 (1994) 
0.50 (1993) 
0.62 (1995) 
0.55 (1993) 
0.45 (1993) 
0.33 (1993) 
5.0 
4.0 
5.0 
12.0 
20.0 
3.5 
8.0 
8.3 
4.0 
[Collective Bargaining/Wage Councils] 
0.55 (1991) 
0.62 (1993) 
0.54 (1994) 
0.55 (1993) 
0.71 (1991) 
0.40 (1993) 
0.52 (1992) 
-
4.0 
6.0 
-
-
-
0.2 
Youth 
Subminimum 
<21 
<21 
No (since 1998) 
< 18 (before 1998) 
<18 
No 
<23 
<18 
<21 
<21 
-
-
<18 
<21 
-
<21 
<21 
Note: (*) National Minimum Wage (since 1999),(*** Wage Councils 
Source: D O L A D O ET AL. , (1996), F R E E M A N (1996), N E U M A R K and W A S C H E R (1999) and L o w PAY C O M -
MISSION (2000) 
in the average wage is less than proportional (see Appendix in DOLADO et al, 1996). 
What this suggests is that knowledge of the so-called spillover effects might be impor-
tant not just for understanding the links between minimum wages and wage inequality 
but also the impact of minimum wages on employment. As mentioned above, given 
that the US has no variation in the minimum wage by age, the minimum wage is very 
high in the youth labour market yet the estimates of its employment impact are very 
small. One possible explanation of this fact is that the spillover effects are very different 
in the US, where unions are weak, the minimum wage acts as a safety net with very little 
spillover effect whereas it may be the case that unions in European countries use in-
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creases in the minimum wage as a launch pad for their wage demands leading to a larger 
spillover effect and a more adverse effect of the minimum wage on employment. Figure 
1 illustrates the differences between agreed minimum wages in collective bargaining and 
the statutory minimum wage in four important industries in Spain which range from 
20 % in the Textile sector to 80 % in the Construction sector. 
Figure 1: Differences between agreed minimum wages and the statuory minimum wage by sectors 
(Spain, Adults) 
1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 
Construction Metal industry 
— - - Hotel and Catering Textile Industry 
Source: DOLADO ET AL. (1997) 
In the case where collective bargaining (or unemployment benefits) provide upper 
floors to wage, the Kaitz index and the spike may give different impressions of the im-
portance of minimum wages. So, e.g., in Sweden, the Kaitz index is higher than in the 
USA, but other institutions compress the wage distribution so strongly that nobody ac-
tually receives the minimum. Some estimates of the spike are also presented in Table 1: 
they tend to be in the region 5-10%, being slightly higher in Greece and Portugal (due 
to the large share of agriculture) and in France (12 %), whose SMIC is often singled out 
as an example of minimum in Europe. 
As regards the evolution of the Kaitz index and the spike over time, shown in Figures 
2 a and 2 b, there are few dramatic changes in the Kaitz index in European countries. It is 
hard to argue from this that aggressive increases in minimum wages caused the stag-
nated performance of European employment. But failure to decrease the index in re-
sponse to changed market circumstances (such as globalisation an skill-biased technical 
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change) might still have had a negative effect. We will have more to say about that later 
in section 8. With regard to the spike, the evidence for many countries is that is has not 
changed much, except France in the 1980s (although it has only returned to the level of 
the 1960s where unemployment was only 2 per cent compared with more than 10 per. 
cent nowadays). Thus, again on this front, the conclusion is that there is no evidence 
that minimum wages are a more serious constraint on the European economies than 30 
years ago. 
Figure 2 a: Kaitz indexes in selected countries 
Source: DOLADO ET AL. (1996) 
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Figure 2 b: The evolution of the spike in France 
o Spike 1 A Spike 2 
20 -
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Source: DOLADO ET AL. (1997) 
Notes: Spike 1 measures the proportion of workers at end-June earning between the old and the new 
SMIC. Spike 2 is an estimate of the proportion of workers in the Enquête Emploi who report earning 
in the band which contains the SMIC multiplied by their usual hours of work (actual earnings are not 
reported). 
4. THE ECONOMICS OF THE MINIMUM WAGE 
The conventional wisdom about the implications of standard economic theory can be 
encapsulated in four propositions: 
(I) A binding (above the competitive wage) minimum wage cannot increase em-
ployment and generally reduces it. 
(II) Its adverse employment effects are largest in small open economies where com-
petitiveness matters the most. 
(III) Young workers are most affected. 
(IV) Minimum wage earners do not usually come from the poorest households, so 
minimum wages do little to alleviate poverty. 
Is this picture accurate? Let us take each point at a time. 
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(I) The standard argument about the effects of a minimum wage hike on employment 
is based on the competitive paradigm. However, embedding the analysis of the effect of 
a minimum wage within a labour market assumed to be perfectly competitive is not the 
only possibility. Labour market textbooks, perhaps as a curiosity, mention that, under, 
monopsony (traditionally identified with a single buyer of labour), a minimum wage 
may boost employment if judiciously set within the range determined by the monopso-
nistic and the competitive wages. Figure 3 depicts the standard graph on this issue where 
the crossing between the solid lines representing the marginal cost and the marginal rev-
enue-product of labour (MRPL) determine the monopsonistic outcome (WmìNm). A 
minimum wage at W0 increases employment from Nm to AT0, whilst at W\ decreases em-
ployment from Nm to TVi. 
Figure 3: A monopsonistic labour market 
0 N{ Nm N0 Employment 
Interpreting monopsony as describing a particular firm with exclusive access to a com-
pletely isolated labour market is surely rare. When other firms are present, one might 
expect competition from alternative employers to monopsony, effectively driving the re-
servation wages of all potential workers up to the competitive wage. What might prevent 
this? The literature sometimes, in parallel with the appearance of the new revisionist 
empirical evidence, has suggested several possibilities: i) Oligopsonistic models which 
rely on non-wage-taking behaviour and where the rate of exploitation will be propor-
tional to concentration of firms (see DEMSETZ, 1973 and BHASKAR and To, 1999). These 
models arise if firms differ discretely along dimensions, like location or working condi-
tions, and workers have heterogeneous preferences over those dimensions, or if workers 
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must pay costs (whether pecuniary or psychic) to change firms (see IOANNIDES and Pis-
SARiDES, 1985); ii) Equilibrium Search models where monopsony is implied by diseco-
nomies of scale in hiring workers (see BURDETT and MORTENSEN, 1989); iii) Efficiency 
Wage models, where firms suffer from diseconomies of scale in monitoring workers and, 
therefore, must increase wages when expanding their workforce to maintain the re-
quired penalty for shirking (see CALVO and WELLISZ, 1979, REBITZER and TAYLOR, 
1995 and MANNING, 1995). A natural implication of these models, is the presence of an 
upward-sloping supply in the long-run; and iv) Training Enhancing models, where a 
binding minimum wage induces workers to raise their productivity to the level of the 
minimum by acquiring education which otherwise would not have been taken (see e.g. 
CAHUC and MICHEL, 1996 and ACEMOGLU and PISCHKE, 1999) 
(II) This argument only makes sense if the market is competitive for then a given rise 
in the minimum wage will have a larger negative effect on employment the more elastic 
(flatter) is the labour demand curve, as is most likely with severe international competi-
tion. Under the competing hypothesis of "monopsony", things are completely different: 
as the labour demand becomes more elastic the potential of the minimum wage to in-
crease employment becomes much larger. The dashed MRPL' line in Figure 3 displays 
this case. 
(III) A high proportion of both research and policy on the effects of minimum wages 
focuses on the young. But while it is certainly true that young workers are more likely to 
be low paid than the average worker, it is not necessarily true that young workers make 
up the bulk of the low paid, since youngsters make up a small proportion of the total 
workforce. Young workers used to be a higher proportion of the low paid, but their im-
portance has declined with rises in school enrolment and women's labour market parti-
cipation. For instance, in the UK at 2/3 median earnings only around 25 % of low wage 
earners are under 20, whereas in Spain the corresponding fraction is 12 %. Thus, in most 
countries, the typical profile of low-pay workers corresponds nowadays to women, 
above 20 with some type of part-time contract. So, while some beneficiaries of a mini-
mum would not be in poor families, an increasing fraction seems to be affected in the 
1980s, (see Table 2). 
Table 2: Characteristics of the low paid 
Proportion female 
Proportion age <21 
Proportion part time 
France 
(1990) 
0.54 
0.09 
0.11 
Netherlands 
(1985) 
0.81 
0.01 
0.71 
Spain 
(1990) 
0.58 
0.41 
0.37 
United 
Kingdom 
(1994) 
0.66 
0.29 
0.52 
Sources: French computations from Enquête Emploi; Netherlands computations from 1985 Wage Sur-
vey; Spanish computations from Valdés (1992), Labour Force Survey and Tax Returns, UK computa-
tions from Labour Force Survey. 
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(IV) There is an important element of truth in this. The main cause of poverty, at least in 
most European countries is unemployment, but as Tables 3 and 4 show (see MARX and 
VERBIST, 1998 and DOLADO et al. 1996), between 50 and 60 % of minimum wage earners 
are in the three lowest deciles of the household income distribution, and the fraction of 
low-paid in single or double-earner households may still range between 5 and 30%. 
Moreover, low wages influence the unemployment rate by affecting the effective repla-
cement rate, i.e., the ratio of out-of-work to in work income. Moreover, the interaction 
of means tested benefits-system with a labour market that is increasingly offering low 
wage-low hour vacancies is proving a barrier to work. In this sense, a judicious rise in 
the minimum wage while keeping unemployment benefits fixed, and moving toward in-
dividual rather than household means testing, would help tackle the poverty trap and 
improve job searching. In this respect, however, an important issue, to be discussed at 
more length in section 7, is whether a negative income tax provides a better means of 
distribution than a minimum wage (see ATKINSON, 1995). 
Table 3: Poverty incidence1 by income configuration, prime-age couples (head aged 25-54) 2 
Poverty incidence Share in sample 
double single no All double single no 
earner3 earner4 earner5 earner3 earner earner5 
Australia 1989 
Belgium 1992 
Canada 1991 
Denmark 1992 
Finland 1991 
Germany 1989 
Netherlands 1991 
Norway 1991 
Spain 1990 
Sweden 1992 
UK 1991 
USA 1991 
0.9 
0.1 
2.8 
0.2 
0.5 
0.7 
0.4 
0.2 
3.8 
0.5 
1.1 
7.1 
9.0 
2.9 
14.0 
1.9 
1.5 
3.5 
3.6 
5.1 
12.0 
4.7 
14.6 
24.6 
64.7 
28.2 
68.5 
12.6 
[18.3] 
[63.7] 
34.8 
[27.5] 
41.9 
26.9 
70.7 
70.2 
5.9 
3.0 
6.4 
0.8 
0.7 
3.0 
3.1 
1.2 
10.8 
1.9 
10.6 
12.4 
67.8 
57.2 
77.4 
83.8 
88.7 
55.5 
51.6 
83.3 
27.3 
83.4 
65.2 
74.4 
27.9 
36.1 
20.6 
13.7 
10.7 
42.8 
44.5 
15.6 
69.3 
13.5 
28.4 
23.8 
4.3 
6.7 
2.0 
2.6 
0.6 
1.7 
3.9 
1.1 
3.4 
3.1 
6.4 
1.8 
Notes: XSQ% of average equivalent income threshold; equivalence scale: 1.0 for first adult, 0.5 for other 
adults and 0.3 for children; 2self-employed excluded; 3both partners non-zero annual earnings; 4one 
partner non-zero annual earnings, other partner zero annual earnings and labour force status constant 
with non-employment; 5both partners zero annual earnings and labour force status consistent with non-
employment. 
Source: LIS. MARX and VERBIST (1998) 
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Table 4: The relationship between minimum wages and income distribution 
France Netherlands Spain United Kingdom 
Decile 
AU 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
% 
affected 
7.2 
10.1 
11.3 
13.1 
8.4 
6.6 
7.4 
7.1 
5.1 
2.2 
0.6 
%of 
affected 
100.0 
13.2 
15.8 
17.7 
11.4 
9.1 
10.7 
9.8 
7.4 
4.1 
0.8 
% 
affected 
11.5 
35.0 
21.0 
24.0 
16.0 
8.0 
5.0 
2.0 
2.0 
1.0 
1.0 
%of 
affected 
100.0 
30.4 
18.2 
20.9 
13.9 
6.9 
4.3 
1.7 
1.7 
0.9 
0.9 
% 
affected 
6.6 
23.5 
12.2 
9.6 
7.4 
6.2 
3.2 
2.1 
1.3 
0.6 
0.1 
%of 
affected 
100.0 
35.5 
18.4 
14.5 
11.2 
9.4 
4.8 
3.2 
2.0 
0.9 
0.2 
% 
affected 
14.5 
41.7 
19.1 
18.2 
12.2 
11.8 
10.3 
12.1 
8.0 
5.4 
6.9 
%of 
affected 
100.0 
28.7 
13.2 
12.5 
8.4 
8.1 
7.1 
8.3 
5.5 
3.7 
4.7 
Notes: For each country, the first column is the proportion of individuals in each decile of the equiva-
lized household income distribution who are minimum wage earners; the second column is the fraction 
of individuals who are affected by the minimum wage who are in each decile. For the Netherlands it is 
the adult rate that is used for all workers, which is why the incidence is high. Households without any 
worker are excluded from these computations. These figures make no allowance for taxes and benefits 
that may be very important in practice. See SUTHERLAND (1995) for an analysis of the UK, NOLAN 
(1993) for Ireland, for analyses including the tax/benefit system. 
Sources: Spain and UK as in Table 3; France from the Enquête Actifs Financiers (1990); the Netherlands 
from a micro model used by the Ministry of Social Affairs. 
The conclusion should be that perfect literate economic arguments can be constructed 
for and against a minimum wage. Theory alone will not resolve the debate: evidence is 
what is needed. 
5. EMPLOYMENT EFFECTS OF THE MINIMUM WAGE 
It is often claimed that the group which most likely pays for the minimum are low-wage 
workers through the loss of jobs. If the elasticity of demand for minimum wage workers 
exceed unity, the minimum will reduce rather than increase the share of earnings going 
to the low-paid. The general conclusion of the studies covering the pre-1980 minimum 
wages is that the estimated elasticity of employment wrt. changes in the minimum was a 
modest -0.2 (see BROWN, GILROY and KOHEN, 1982). More recent research surveyed in 
NEUMARK and WASCHER (1999) raises that elasticity in some cases up to -0.4 or -0.5. The 
implication of these results is that a rise of the minimum wage of 10 per cent reduces 
employment by just 4 or 5 per cent and therefore increases the share of income received 
by minimum wage earners by 5 or 6 per cent. In the early 1990s, the new set of revisio-
nist studies even found more favourable evidence since there was absence of noticeable 
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employment losses (in some cases there were even gains). Perhaps the most interesting 
case is France, whose minimum wage (SMIC) is often singled out as being at such a high 
level that it causes serious harm to employment. Yet it is hard to find much evidence in 
favour of this (see DOLADO et al., 1996). Notwithstanding, more recent and scrutiniuous 
evidence provided by LAROQUE and SALANIE (1999) finds that the French minimum 
wage (about 5,000 francs per month in 1997) explains close to 15 % of non-employment 
for married women. 
Still, it is possible to concede that if even only a few workers are disemployed by the 
minimum, there may be some undesirable redistributive effects, particularly in labour 
markets where labour turnover is low and duration of joblessness is high (as in many 
European countries). This is so, since there is the risk that a minimum will divide the 
low-paid workforce into lucky winners and unlucky losers. Furthermore, there may be 
another undesirable consequence stemming from larger participation of skilled workers 
whose reservation wage is high and were not searching before. In this case, it is quite 
possible that middle-class secondary earners will "steal" the jobs from the lower-income 
applicants even without any reduction in the demand for labour (see more on this in sec-
tion 6). 
Finally, the effects of minimum wages may depend on how it fits in labour relation 
systems. As above mentioned, if the wage-setting system is such that higher-paid work-
ers restore the differentials that the minimum has reduced, the redistributive purpose of 
the minimum wage could be subverted. There is again evidence that, in some European 
countries, changes in the minimum wage may well trigger general wage settlements, 
though the causality more likely runs in the opposite direction. There is also the case, as 
in Spain, where agreed minima in collective bargaining is superimposed on the statutory 
minima, enhancing the probability of inducing wage inflation and job losses (see DO-
LADO et al, 1997 and 1998). Finally it could be the case that a rise in the minimum could 
lead some employers to reduce other non-pecuniary benefits in ways that would make 
minimum wage earners worse off. However, this issue is probably of most importance if 
most earners are part-time workers who are not entitled to those benefits anyway. 
In spite of those relevant remarks, our reading of the new evidence is that in almost all 
cases under scrutiny, the minimum wage has been an effective redistributive tool with no 
apparent serious adverse effect on employment (though the rise of youth minimum in 
Spain in 1990 had some serious adverse effects on the job opportunities of workers). 
Conversely, the reduction/abolition of minimum wages in UK did not show any dramatic 
improvement in the job fortunes of the workers affected (see Dickens et al., 1999), albeit 
they did in the Netherlands (see NICKELL and VAN OURS, 2000). That adverse effects 
were hardly noticeable in most cases is no mean achievement for a policy tool in an era 
when the real earnings of the less skilled fell sharply in countries where no wage floors 
were present. 
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6. WHO SUPPORTS THE MINIMUM WAGE? 
The obvious answer is that it is supported by those who are likely to enjoy a wage rise. 
However the are more subtle arguments. For example, there are also some groups which 
may favour minimum wages because it makes low-paid labour less attractive to employ-
ers (high wage firms, unionised sectors) and therefore try to build barriers to competi-
tiveness by making cheap labour more expensive. Alternative views can be obtained by 
interpreting the minimum wage, as any other labour market institution, from a political 
economy perspective. According to SAINT-PAUL (1996), assuming that spillovers are 
negligible, the main difference between minimum wage and other institutions is that it 
affects mostly the bottom of the income distribution, contrary to, say, unemployment 
benefits which directly affect all workers. An interesting argument is that the decisive 
median voter in this framework will possibly be an employed worker whose wage is 
slightly above the minimum. This is so if this group of workers can enjoy a high degree 
of substitutability with the workers who lose their jobs due to the minimum wage and a 
high degree of complementarity with capital. A rise in the minimum wage, by eliminat-
ing the least-skilled, would therefore increase the MRPL of the semi-skilled and hence 
their wages. Alternatively, the ruling "middle class" supports the minimum wage as a 
way of buying "social peace". As long as the excluded are not numerous enough to be 
politically important, it is cheaper to exclude them than to redistribute to everybody. 
Conversely, they will oppose a reduction in the minimum wage since firms will be 
tempted to replace them with cheaper workers (this may explain why the French gov-
ernment's attempt to lower the minimum wage for youngsters in 1994 was mostly op-
posed by young people whose potential wages were above the minimum wage but just 
by a narrow margin). 
7. THE MINIMUM WAGES AS A POLICY TOOL 
The minimum wage is not the only way to improve the living standards of the low-paid. 
Those who argue that a minimum wage is desirable need to show that it is a more effec-
tive policy tool than alternatives like reductions of unskilled labour taxes, subsidies fi-
nanced by progressive labour income taxes (including in-work benefits) or the introduc-
tion of a non-distorting negative income tax. As already mentioned, the inefficiency of 
the minimum is the lost employment (if any) whereas the inefficiency of the tax transfer 
is the excess burden of taxes due to supply responses by taxpayers and the reduction in 
labour supply by low wage workers. As FREEMAN (1994) has pointed out, the choice be-
tween the two policies depends on their relative costs which in turn depend on the i) le-
vel of taxes; ii) elasticity of supply of high-wage earners; iii) income effect on the labour 
supply of low-wage workers; iv) job loss owing to the minimum; v) turnover of low-paid 
workers; and, vi) household income of low-wage workers. 
A strategy based on minimum wages would be more effective if existing taxes are al-
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ready high, high-wage workers have a large supply elasticity, low-wage workers have a 
large income effect, the demand for labour is inelastic (or even better if there is mono-
psony), labour turnover is high and few low-wage earners belong to high-income fa-
milies. What does the evidence say on these issues? Probably, at least in Europe, it says 
that taxes are high, high-wage workers' supply elasticity is not large, income effects 
among low-paid are small, displacement effects are scarce, turnover is high and that 
there is an increasing fraction of poverty due to low pay. In sum, the score in favour of 
minimum wages is 4 out of 6 points. 
In this respect, an interesting issue is whether the existence of minimum wages would 
be justified if an optimal taxation scheme were to be available. In such a case, resources 
would be maximised, under a competitive labour market, and redistribution could be 
achieved at a lower cost than when minimum wage is imposed where, through a rise in 
unskilled labour cost and unemployment, resources are smaller. Thus, an obvious ques-
tion is why such a tax/subsidy system does not completely eliminate minimum wages 
(see SAINT-PAUL, 1994). An answer to this question relies on second-best considerations 
(only linear taxes are considered, as in ALLEN (1987), or employment subsidies are ex-
cluded, as in DRÈZE and GOLLIER, 1993) or simply than non-competitive features 
abound in the workings of the labour market. However, even if they were to be absent, 
political economy considerations may preclude the implementation of optimal negative 
tax systems. The argument, developed by LEHMAN (2000), is that if decisions on the way 
redistribution occurs are in the scope of skilled workers, they will realise that, since the 
potential amount of redistribution is lower under a minimum wage, it is in their interest 
to block the possibility of a negative income tax and hence to redistribute less through 
the minimum wage. 
However the available alternative is not either minimum wage or tax/subsidy schemes 
on their own. Both can co-exist. For instance, in work-benefits are successful if by in-
creasing labour supply they generate downward pressure on wages and the taxpayer 
then subsidises low-wage jobs through the in-work credit scheme. When used in con-
junction with minimum wages, however, there is a floor below which wages cannot fall, 
creating savings for the taxpayer and reducing the unemployment trap. To achieve this, 
nonetheless, long hours of work are needed to lift households out of the benefit receipt, 
which probably implies changing the available working hours thresholds in current in-
work benefits systems. For example, in Figure 4, it is shown how the ratio between the 
minimum wage and poverty threshold has been declining in the US, to the extent that 
the Earned Income Tax Credit was expanded in 1993 to enable full-time minimum 
wage workers in families above three to be lifted out of poverty. 
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Figure 4: Ratio Federal Minimum Wage / poverty rresholds by family size in US (1966-1997) 
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8. CROSS-COUNTRY EVIDENCE 
In this section, we summarise some of the "new minimum wage research" of recent 
years using NEUMARK and WASCHER (1999) 'S results on the estimation of the effects of 
the minimum wages on youth employment by means of a pooled cross-section times-ser-
ies data set comprising fifteen OECD countries for the period 1975-1997. This is a parti-
cularly interesting exercise since international data provides much greater variation than 
any of the national studies while it allows to control for a wide variety of labour market 
institutions/policies which either reduce or amplify the effects of minimum wages. 
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The model they estimate is as follows: 
Eit = 6t+ XitT + m + (A) + ßiPi)MWit + vi% 
(i = l , . . . ,n ; t = l> . . .> r ) 
Where Eit is the employment rate of a particular age group; 6t denotes a set of time 
dummy variables, Xit is a set of controls (adult employment rates, ratio of youth to adult 
population); Pi is a set of time-invariant controls representing different institutions and 
policies, comprising two indexes of labour standards and employment protection regula-
tion, both developed by the OECD, and the level of public expenditures on active labour 
market policies as a proportion of GDP, as of 1995; MWit is the Kaitz index; and vit is an 
i.i.d. error term. Two age groups are distinguished: "teenagers" (15-19) and "youths" 
(15-24). 
Table 5 reports the estimated minimum wage effects on the employment ratios, calcu-
lated as the coefficient on MWit, plus each of the coefficients on the interaction term 
multiplied by the value of the policy/institution variable for each country. We have or-
dered the countries from those with the most deleterious effects to those with the most 
beneficial effects, for both age groups. There are seven countries where the estimated 
elasticities are negative and statistically significant where for the remaining eight coun-
tries in the sample they are either insignificant or even positive. Moreover, the results 
are not very robust to the inclusion of fixed country effects as an additional regressor. 
For example, the elasticity for Sweden, the country with the most negative effect, turn 
out to be around 0.2 in such case. In general, those dummy variable could be capturing 
the existence of subminima for youth or by sector or that other minima are set at the 
collective bargaining being superimposed on the statutory ones. 
Overall, we regard those estimates as providing the somewhat confusing menu of re-
sults which have been found in the national studies although they provide some light on 
the interaction of minimum wage with other labour market policies/institutions. In parti-
cular, the role of active labour market policies seems to be the paramount in explaining 
the relative performance of various countries. 
The previous estimates, however, allow us to carry out an admittedly bold exercise re-
garding the likely employment effects of introducing a statutory minimum wage in Swit-
zerland which was one of the key issues to be addressed at this conference. The esti-
mated elasticities for ß0 and the three components of ß\ are -0.32, -0.40, 0.12 and 0.02 
(for youths) and -0.24, -0,89, 0.29 and 0.15 (for teenagers), respectively. The correspond-
ing values for Switzerland of the Pt variables are: Labour Standards (3), Employment 
Protection (1.75) and Active Policies (0.48). Using those values, in deviation from the 
sample averages, yields the following elasticities: -0.90 (for youth) and -2.00 (for teen-
agers). These elasticities are very high mainly due to the relatively high level of Labour 
Standards in Switzerland. Nonetheless, as is the case with Sweden, which also has very 
high negative elasticities, it may be that the incidence is low, covering the above esti-
mates with a large dose of uncertainty. 
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Table 5: Implied Minimum Wage Elasticities 
Country 
Sweden 
Greece 
New Zealand 
Netherlands 
Spain 
Germany 
France 
Denmark 
Italy 
Canada 
Japan 
Belgium 
U.S. 
Portugal 
UK 
Youths 
-1.26 
(.23) 
-1.03 
(.27) 
-0.97 
(.20) 
-0.65 
(.11) 
-0.60 
(.11) 
-0.49 
(.10) 
-0.39 
(.08) 
-0.28 
(.22) 
-0.24 
(.12) 
-0.11 
(.12) 
0.12 
(.13) 
0.13 
(.15) 
0.13 
(.15) 
0.35 
(.24) 
0.36 
(.19) 
Country 
Sweden 
New Zealand 
Greece 
Netherlands 
Spain 
Germany 
France 
Denmark 
Canada 
Italy 
US 
Japan 
Belgium 
UK 
Portugal 
Teenagers 
-2.08 
(.35) 
-1.81 
(.30) 
-1.74 
(.42) 
-0.97 
(.16) 
-0.73 
(.17) 
-0.42 
(.15) 
-0.29 
(.12) 
-0.19 
(.35) 
-0.03 
(.18) 
0.18 
(.18) 
0.42 
(.23) 
0.51 
(.20) 
0.92 
(.35) 
1.02 
(.29) 
1.41 
(.36) 
Notes: Taken from Table 8 (columns 4 and 9) in NEUMARK and WASCHER (1999). Standard errors in par-
entheses. 
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9. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Our reading of the evidence shown in this paper is that a minimum wage is not a panacea 
to poverty but it helps to redistribute income. It is true that, as any other redistributive, 
interventions, it has inefficiency losses and may not always help those it is intended to 
work. It is also true that the long-term well-being of workers depends ultimately on in-
creasing their productivity and setting a minimum wage may not help in this respect. 
However, policies to raise skills and potential earnings will do little to alleviate poverty 
in the short run. Thus, if judiciously chosen (set different rates across sectors and age), 
without interfering with the available wage-setting procedures (better in decentralised 
systems) or with existing in-work benefit systems (it should increase participation) or 
payroll taxes (there may be case for subsiding the social security payments of minimum 
wage earners), it can do more well than harm in breaking the lock of the poverty trap. In 
rethinking the welfare society, the mantra that minimum wages always cost jobs -and the 
insistence on a particular model of pay and employment that lies behind it- should be 
taken with great doses of scepticism, as many international institutions and national gov-
ernments seem to be taking nowadays. 
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SUMMARY 
In order to offer a balanced assessment of the role of minimum wages in the Welfare 
State, seven basic questions need to be answered: (i) Why is the minimum wage a useful 
redistributive tool?; (ii) How binding are minimum wage floors in different countries?; 
(iii) To what extent do minimum wages have the adverse consequences that standard 
analysis predict?; (iv) Are there strong theoretical grounds underlying the revisionist re-
sults?; (v) Who supports minimum wages?; (vi) Under which conditions is the minimum 
wage a better tool than other policy instruments to achieve income redistribution?; and, 
finally, (vii) What is the overall cross-country time-series evidence regarding the em-
ployment effect of the minima? The aim in this paper is to provide an appraisal on the 
available evidence for each of the above-mentioned issues. 
ZUSAMMENFASSUNG 
Für eine ausgewogene Einschätzung der Rolle von Mindestlöhnen im Wohlfahrtsstaat 
müssen sieben grundlegende Fragen beantwortet werden: (i) Warum ist der Mindest-
lohn ein nützliches Instrument zur Umverteilung?; (ii) Wie bindend sind Mindestlohn-
bestimmungen in den verschiedenen Ländern?; (iii) In welchem Ausmass haben Min-
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destlöhne die entgegengesetzten Auswirkungen, welche die Standardtheorie vorher-
sagt?; (iv) Sind diese entgegensetzten Auswirkungen theoretisch fundiert?; (v) Wer 
unterstützt die Idee von Mindestlöhnen?; (vi) Unter welchen Bedingungen ist der 
Mindestlohn besser geeignet als andere wirtschaftspolitische Instrumente, um eine Ein-
kommensumverteilung zu erreichen?; und schliesslich, (vii) Wie sieht die empirische 
Evidenz betreffend des Beschäftigungseffektes von Mindestlöhnen aus? Ziel dieses Ar-
tikels ist es, für jede der oben erwähnten Fragen eine Bewertung der verfügbaren Evi-
denz zu geben. 
RESUME 
Afin d'arriver à un jugement équilibré du rôle d'un salaire minimal dans l'Etat provi-
dence, sept questions essentielles doivent être examinées: (i) Pourquoi le salaire mini-
mal est-il un instrument de redistribution utile?; (ii) A quel point les règles concernant 
le salaire minimal ont-elles force obligatoire dans les différents pays?; (iii) Dans quelle 
mesure le salaire minimal mène-t-il aux conséquences contraires prédites par la théorie 
standard?; (iv) Ces conséquences contraires sont-elles théoriquement fondées?; (v) Qui 
supporte l'idée d'un salaire minimal?; (vi) Dans quelles circonstances le salaire minimal 
est-il plus adéquat pour provoquer une redistribution des salaires que d'autres instru-
ments de politique économique?; et finalement (vii) Quelle est l'évidence empirique 
concernant les effets d'un salaire minimal sur l'emploi? Le présent article a pour but de 
fournir une appréciation de l'évidence disponible pour chacune de ces questions. 
